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THE ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
FOR BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ARE THERE 
MURKY WATERS IN THEIR FUTURE?t 
Paul E. Fiorelli* 
Cynthia J. Rooney** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Changes in how the federal courts deal with environmental viola-
tions are imminent. The only questions are when will the changes 
occur and what will the changes look like? 
The workings of change will come about through amendments to 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The amendment process begins 
when the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Com-
mission) makes recommendations to Congress for amendments to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) on or before May 1 of any 
given year.! If Congress does not amend these recommendations be-
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128 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988). 
[d. 
The Commission, at or after the beginning of a regular session of Congress, but not 
later than the first day of May, may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section 
and submit to Congress amendments to the guidelines and modifications to previously 
submitted amendments that have taken effect, including modifications to the effective 
dates of such amendments. Such an amendment or modification shall be accompanied 
by a statement of the reasons therefor and shall take effect on a date specified by the 
Commission, which shall be no earlier than 180 days after being so submitted and no 
later than the first day of November of the calendar year in which the amendment or 
modification is submitted, except to the extent the effective date is revised or the 
amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of Congress. 
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fore November 1 of that same year, the recommendations are incor-
porated into the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manua12 (Guidelines 
Manual), which federal judges are bound to follow in determining 
criminal sanctions.3 
The Sentencing Commission has specifically excluded environmen-
tal violations by business organizations from the fining provisions of 
Chapter 8 of the Guidelines Manual, the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.4 The Sentencing Commission excluded such violations un-
der the belief that the formula used to determine organizational fines 
did not reflect the potential damages caused by environmental mis-
haps.5 In 1992, however, the Sentencing Commission empaneled a 
sixteen-member Advisory Work Group (AWG) comprised of environ-
mentalists, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and academics to examine 
the issue of environmental sentencing guidelines for business organi-
zations.6 The AWG released draft recommendations dealing with en-
vironmental sentencing guidelines for business organizations to the 
Sentencing Commission on November 17, 1993.7 On December 8, 1993, 
two members of the AWG issued a strongly worded dissent to the 
draft proposal.s On February 24, 1994, the AWG formally presented 
its draft proposal to the Sentencing Commission for consideration.9 
The Sentencing Commission, however, chose not to send this proposal 
to Congress. Nevertheless, even though the Sentencing Commission 
did not adopt the AWG's proposal, there is a strong possibility that 
significant portions of the proposal will form the basis of the Sentenc-
ing Commissions's future recommendations for environmental sen-
tencing guidelines for business organizations. As one commentator 
has noted: 
2Id. 
318 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). 
4 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 8C2.1 (Nov. 1994) [here-
inafter Guidelines Manual]. 
5 See id. (Background). For further information about why environmental violations were 
excluded from Chapter 8's fining provisions, see generally RAKOFF ET AL., CORPORATE SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE AND MITIGATION §§ 8.01[1] and 8.01[2] (1994). 
6 See Joe D. Whitley & Trent B. Speckhals, Increased Prosecution Is Predicted: New Sentenc-
ing Guidelines for Organizations May Lead to More Frequent Charges Against Corporations 
for Environmental Crimes, NAT'L L.J. (Environmental Law Section C), Dec. 5,1994, at Cl. 
7Id. 
8 Report on Advisory Work Group on Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations Convicted of 
Environmental Crimes, Dissenting Views by Lloyd S. Guerci and Meredith Hemphill, Jr. (Dec. 
8,1993) (copy on file with the editor of the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review) 
[hereinafter Dissent]. 
9 Marianne LaVelle & Harvey Berkman, Rules Proposed on Environmental Sentencing, 
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 1994, at A7. 
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The commission elected not to adopt the proposed guidelines, 
motivated in part by strong dissension among members of the 
advisory group as to the necessity of a separate chapter strictly 
for corporate crimes, as well as by the expiration of the term of 
Commissioner Ilene Nagel, chairman of the advisory group .... 
Despite the decision, many of the features of corporate environ-
mental compliance programs embraced by the proposed guide-
lines could become part of future amendments to the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines. Therefore, companies should be aware of the 
substance of the proposed guidelines and should consider becom-
ing involved in the development of future guidelines for sentenc-
ing corporate environmental offenders.10 
483 
In October of 1994, the Senate approved President Clinton's recom-
mendations for four new Sentencing Commission members.ll The new 
commissioners, Richard P. Conaboy (the new chairman of the Sen-
tencing Commission), Wayne A. Budd, Michael Goldsmith, and Judge 
Deanel R. Tacha, provide a "full complement of seven [Sentencing 
Commission] members for the first time in nearly three years."12 The 
new Sentencing Commission will have to address environmental vio-
lations and will have to make its proposals to a new Republican 
Congress. In order for business organizations to deal proactively with 
concerns surrounding the AWG's Guidelines proposal regarding envi-
ronmental violations by business organizations, they need to understand 
the proposal as well as the dissenters' concerns. This Article will 
analyze the proposed Chapter 9 Environmental Sentencing Guide-
lines (ESG) and the dissent to the proposed ESG. Specifically, this 
Article will compare the proposed ESG and the dissent to the proposed 
ESG with the existing Individual Sentencing Guidelines-Chapter 1 
to Chapter 7-and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines-Chap-
ter 8. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. Individual Guidelines 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.13 
Included within this legislation was a plan to drastically reform exist-
10 Kenneth D. Woodrow, The Proposed Federal Environmental Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Model for Corporate Environmental Compliance Programs, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 325, 327 
(June 17, 1994). 
11 U.S. Judge Heads Sentencing Panel, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 24,1994, at 2. 
12Id. 
13 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-8742 (Supp. IV 1986), 28 
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986». 
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ing federal sentencing practices.14 One of Congress's major complaints 
with the existing criminal law was the lack of uniformity in sentenc-
ing.15 As Congress noted, "[t]he shameful disparity in criminal sen-
tences is a major flaw in the existing criminal justice system, and 
makes it clear that the system is ripe for reform."16 The problem was 
exemplified by situations in which some federal judges sentenced 
convicted offenders to probation while other judges, under similar 
circumstances, imposed maximum prison terms.17 Congress feared 
that this lack of sentencing uniformity bred contempt and failed to 
deter crime effectively.ls Congress's concern was expressed in a Sen-
ate committee report, which stated that "[s]entences that are dispro-
portionate to the seriousness of the offense create a disrespect for the 
law. Sentences that are too severe create unnecessary tensions among 
inmates and add to disciplinary problems in the prisons."19 
To remedy this situation, Congress created the Sentencing Com-
mission, composed of seven voting and two ex-officio members.20 Out 
of the seven voting members, three must be sitting federal judges, 
and not more than four members can be of the same political party.21 
The President possesses the power to appoint or remove Commission-
ers,22 and Congress can amend or revoke any of the guidelines prom-
ulgated by the Sentencing Commission.23 
Congress instructed the Sentencing Commission to create sentenc-
ing guidelines which all federal judges would have to follow unless the 
judges stated in open court the reasons for their departure.24 One way 
that the Sentencing Commission encouraged judges to stay within the 
guidelines was to give both defendants and prosecutors the ability to 
appeal a judge's departure from the guidelines.25 "If the appellate 
court finds that a sentence outside the guidelines is unreasonable, the 
14Id. 
15 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3248. 
16Id. 
17Id. at 3227. 
18Id. at 3229. 
19Id. 
20 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). From 1984 until 1989, two ex-officio members sat on the Sentenc-
ing Commission. Since 1989, only one ex-officio member has sat on the Sentencing Commission. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988). 
24 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 3262. 
25 Id. at 3263. Also see 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) and (b) (1988), which allow either the defendant 
or the government to appeal a district court judge's sentence if the judge sentences a defendant 
outside of the applicable Guidelines range. 
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case may be remanded to the trial court for resentencing or the 
sentence may be amended by the appellate court."26 
The Sentencing Commission first addressed the problem of sen-
tencing individual defendants, and in May of 1987 presented Congress 
with the Individual Sentencing Guidelines (ISG).27 The ISG became 
law on November 1, 1987, and were codified at Chapter 1 through 
Chapter 7 of the Guidelines Manua1.28 The formula for consistent 
sentencing under the ISG analyzed both the seriousness of the par-
ticular offense and the culpability of the particular defendant. These 
components were then plotted on a 258 cell (43 x 6) matrix which 
would determine the appropriate sentencing range.29 (See Table 1). 
The horizontal axis (rows) of the matrix is comprised of forty-three 
offense levels.30 Chapter 2 of the Guidelines specifically states the base 
offense level for a significant portion of federal criminal violations.31 
The vertical axis (columns) of the matrix is comprised of six cate-
gories based on the defendant's criminal history.32 The judge deter-
mines the appropriate category by calculating "points," which are a 
function of the number and the severity of the defendant's prior 
convictions.33 The total number of points determines the relevant 
criminal history and, when combined with the total offense level, 
produce a sentencing range. While judges have discretion within the 
given range, judges are limited in their ability to go outside the given 
range.34 
26 Id. 
27 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, at Chapters 1-7. 
'2fJId. 
29Id. at Chapter 5, Part A-Sentencing Table. 
30 Each increased level carries with it a correspondingly higher sentencing range. Id. For 
example, a level 10 offense has a 6--12 months sentencing range, and a level 11 offense has an 
8-14 months sentencing range. Id. 
3! Id. at Chapters 2--6. Appendix A of the Guidelines Manual provides cross-references for 
where specific sections of the Guidelines appear in the United States Code. See id. 
32 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, at Chapter 5, Part A-Sentencing Table. 
33 Id. § 4A1.l(a)-(f). Three points are added for each prison sentence exceeding 13 months. 
'l\vo points are added for a term of imprisonment between 2 and 13 months. One point is 
added-up to a maximum of four points-for each prior sentence of less than two months. There 
are also adjustments for when the instant offense was committed while the offender was under 
a criminal justice sentence (in which case two points are added) and for when the instant offense 
was committed less than two years after the offender's release from prison (in which case two 
points are added). Id. 
34 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 3234-36. Even though this appears to be a mechanical 
application of a mathematical formula, Congress did not want judges to lose all sentencing 
discretion: 
The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be imposed in a mechanistic fashion. 
It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant 
factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an appropriate case. 
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Table 1 (sentences in months)35 
Offense I II III IV V VI 
Level o or 1 2 or 3 4,5,6 7,8,9 10,11,12 13 or more 
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 O-{i 1-7 
3 0-6 O-{i O-{i 0-6 2-8 3-9 
4 0-6 0-6 O-{i 2-8 4-10 6-12 
5 0-6 O-{i 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15 
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18 
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21 
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24 
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27 
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30 
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33 
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37 
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41 
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46 
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51 
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57 
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-{i3 
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-{i3 57-71 
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78 
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-{i3 63-78 70-87 
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96 
22 41-51 46-57 51-{i3 63-78 77-96 84-105 
23 46-57 51-{i3 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115 
24 51-{i3 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125 
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137 
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150 
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162 
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175 
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188 
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
43 life life life life life life 
The purpose of the sentencing guideline is to provide a structure for evaluating the 
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate 
the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences. 
[d. 
35 See Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, at Chapter 5, Part A-Sentencing Table. 
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Part Q, Section 2 of the Guidelines deals specifically with environ-
mental violations.36 An example of a criminal sanction against an indi-
vidual environmental offender appears in Section 2Q1.1, "Knowing 
Endangerment Resulting From Mishandling Hazardous or Toxic Sub-
stances, Pesticides or Other Pollutants." The Guidelines designate 
such an offense a base offense level of 24. Assuming that the offender 
has been convicted previously of two fifteen-month environmental 
violations, the offender's criminal history point total would be 6, or a 
Category III offense.37 Viewing Table 1, the offender would face a 
minimum of sixty-three months imprisonment and a maximum of 
seventy-eight months imprisonment. While the Sentencing Commis-
sion addressed individual offenders of both environmental and nonen-
vironmental crimes in the ISG, the Sentencing Commission chose to 
address only nonenvironmental offenses in the fining provisions of 
Chapter 8 of the Guidelines-the Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines (OSG). 
B. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
In 1988, the Sentencing Commission began to develop guidelines to 
deal with organizational crimes.38 It appeared that the Sentencing 
Commission would be ready to present proposals to Congress before 
the May 1, 1990 deadline, but the Sentencing Commission decided to 
wait another year in order to fill three membership vacancies.39 After 
the vacancies were filled during 1990, the full Sentencing Commission 
continued to address the issue of corporate fines by preparing drafts, 
holding public hearings, and soliciting comments from the business 
community, academics, probation officers, and attorneys.40 On May 1, 
1991, the Sentencing Commission sent to Congress its proposed amend-
ments for the sentencing of corporate and individual defendants for 
nonenvironmental crimes.41 The Sentencing Commission's proposed 
amendments were enacted as amendments to the Guidelines on N 0-
vember 1, 1991, and became Chapter 8 of the Guidelines Manua1.42 
36 See id. at Chapter 2, Part Q-Offenses Involving the Environment. This section, which deals 
with sanctions against individuals, has also provided the framework for the AWG's proposal for 
fines against organizations for environmental offenses. 
37 See id. § 4Al.1(a)-CO. Three points are added to the criminal history category for every 
violation exceeding 13 months. See id. 
38 See Fred Strasser, Lighter Corporate Sentencing, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 9, 1990, at 3. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,786, 22,787 (1991). 
42 See Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, at Chapter 8. 
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C. Goals of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
The stated goals of the Sentencing Commission's OSG are to "pro-
vide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organi-
zations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting and 
reporting criminal conduct."43 The OSG attempt to accomplish these 
goals through the following means: (1) providing victim restitution;44 
(2) divesting the crime-infested organization of its assets;45 and (3) 
determining an appropriate, additional fine based on the seriousness 
of the offense and the culpability of the organization.46 
The seriousness of the offense is determined by establishing a base 
fine, which is the greatest of the following: (1) the pecuniary loss 
suffered by the victim;47 (2) the pecuniary gain received by the defen-
dant;48 or (3) a penalty determined by analyzing the Offense Level 
Fine Table.49 (See Table 2). These table amounts are calculated by 
using the base offense level, with any adjustments, as established in 
Chapter 2 of the Guidelines.50 The fine range from the Table, before 
any multiplier or reducer is applied, is $5,000 to $72,500,000.51 
Regardless of whether the base fine is calculated by the greater of 
the defendant's pecuniary gain, the victim's pecuniary loss, or the 
Offense Level Fine Table penalty, this amount can be either increased 
43 See id. (Introductory Commentary). 
44 [d. § 8C3.3(a). One of the most important goals is providing restitution to victims. This goal 
is apparent in the Guidelines provisions that allow a fine to be reduced or deferred if such a 
reduction or deferral would limit the ability of a defendant to repay victims. 
45 [d. § 8CLl. Organizations with a primary purpose to engage in criminal activity were dealt 
the harshest blow. The guidelines permit the sentencing judge to construct a fine large enough 
to disgorge the criminal organization of all of its assets. See id. 
46 See id. (Introductory Commentary). 
47 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8C2.4(a)(3). 
48 [d. § 8C2.4(a)(2). 
49 [d. § 8C2.4(a)(1). 
50 [d. § 8C2.3(a). 
51 [d. § 8C2.4(d). With maximum and minimum multipliers of 5% to 400%, this Table range is 
effectively extended from $250 ($5,000 x 0.05) to $290,000,000 ($72,500,000 x 4.0). See infra notes 
53-58 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2 Offense Level Fine Table52 
OFFENSE LEVEL AMOUNT 
6 or less $5,000 
7 7,500 
8 10,000 
9 15,000 
10 20,000 
11 30,000 
12 40,000 
13 60,000 
14 85,000 
15 125,000 
16 175,000 
17 250,000 
18 350,000 
19 500,000 
20 650,000 
21 910,000 
22 1,200,000 
23 1,600,000 
24 2,100,000 
25 2,800,000 
26 3,700,000 
27 4,800,000 
28 6,300,000 
29 8,100,000 
30 10,500,000 
31 13,500,000 
32 17,500,000 
33 22,000,000 
34 28,500,000 
35 36,000,000 
36 45,500,000 
37 57,500,000 
38 or more 72,500,000 
62 See Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8C2.4(d). 
490 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:481 
or decreased based upon the organization's culpability score.53 For any 
given culpability score, the judge has the discretion to impose a fine 
within a minimum and maximum range.54 (See Table 3). A higher 
culpability score establishes a higher minimum and maximum range 
of multipliers.55 The maximum multiplier is four times the fine, which 
has the mathematic effect of mUltiplying a fine by 400%.56 A lower 
cUlpability score decreases the minimum and maximum multipliers, 
which can dramatically reduce a fine.57 The minimum multiplier is 0.05 
times the fine, which has the mathematic effect of dividing the fine by 
twenty.58 
Table 359 
CULPABILITY MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SCORE MULTIPLIER MULTIPLIER 
10 or more 2.00 4.00 
9 1.80 3.60 
8 1.60 3.20 
7 1.40 2.80 
6 1.20 2.40 
5 1.00 2.00 
4 0.80 1.60 
3 0.60 1.20 
2 0.40 0.80 
1 0.20 0.40 
o or less 0.05 0.20 
An organization's culpability score begins with five points,60 and 
may be either increased or decreased depending upon certain factors. 
The culpability score will be increased based upon the judge's determin-
ation of the following factors: (1) the size of the organization;61 (2) the 
involvement of top officials in the organization;62 (3) any prior viola-
tions by the organization;63 and (4) any obstruction of justice by the 
organization.64 The culpability score will be decreased based upon the 
judge's determination of the following factors: (1) whether the organi-
53 Id. § 8C2.5. 
54 Id. § 8C2.6. 
55 Id. 
56Id. 
57 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8C2.6. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. § 8C2.6. 
6°Id. § 8C2.5(a). 
61Id. § 8C2.5(b)(1)-(5). 
62 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A)(i). 
63 Id. § 8C2.5(c). 
64 Id. § 8C2.5(e). 
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zation possessed an effective program to prevent and detect viola-
tions;66 (2) whether the organization voluntarily disclosed its violations 
to the appropriate authority;66 (3) whether the organization cooper-
ated with an investigation conducted by the appropriate authority;67 
and (4) whether the organization accepted responsibility for its im-
proper conduct.68 The potential impact of the OSG are demonstrated 
by the following example: 
... two companies of comparable size, convicted for similar viola-
tions, that have each been fined $20,000,000. Company A has an 
effective program to prevent and detect violations. It voluntarily 
reported the violation to the appropriate governmental authority; 
cooperated in the investigation, and accepted responsibility after-
wards. Company B's top managers either knew, or should have 
known, about the violations, but did nothing to prevent them. It 
did not cooperate with the subsequent government investigation, 
and denied culpability even after the conviction. Company A could 
have its fine reduced from $20,000,000 to $1,000,000 ($20,000,000 
x 5% = $1,000,000). Company B could have its fine increased 
to $80,000,000 ($20,000,000 x 400% = $80,000,000). Thus a com-
pany with no ethics [compliance] programs may be forced to pay 
a fine eighty times that paid by a company with an acceptable 
ethics [compliance] program, despite similar misconduct. With 
potential fines ranging up to, and possibly exceeding $290,000,000 
($72,500,000 x 400%) the slogan, "Good Ethics is Good Business" 
has gained new meaning and importance.69 
Even though the OSG have existed since November 1, 1991, there 
have been few cases to provide insight as to the actual impact the 
OSG have had on organizations. This lack of insight reflects the im-
perfect environment in which the AWG developed its proposal for the 
Chapter 9 Environmental Sentencing Guidelines. 
III. ADVISORY WORK GROUP PROPOSALS 
This section discusses how the AWG's proposal differs from the 
OSG's established procedures. The following are the four most impor-
tant departures of the AWG's proposal: (1) the method of calculating 
fines; (2) the impact of corporate compliance programs on sentencing; 
65 [d. § 8C2.5(f). See generally, Paul E. Fiorelli, Fine Reductions Through Effective Ethics 
Programs, 56 ALB. L. REV. 403 (1992) (explaining steps organizations can take to develop 
compliance programs that should qualify for fine reductions). 
66 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8C2.5(g)(1). 
67 [d. § 8C2.5(g)(2). 
68 [d. § 8C2.5(g)(3). 
69 Fiorelli, supra note 65, at 407"'{)8. This example assumes that the fine does not exceed the 
statutory maximum. 
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(3) a "collar" provision, limiting the impact of mitigating factors; and 
(4) "count stacking" for multiple or continuous violations. 
A. Fine Calculations 
One of the fundamental changes made in the AWG's proposal was 
the method of fine calculation. The proposal calls for an organization 
to be fined based upon a range of percentages of the statutory maxi-
mum fine-usually $500,000 per environmental violation.70 (See Table 
4). The mandatory range would be determined by assigning offense 
levels for six different environmental offense characteristics.71 This 
offense level would then be increased or decreased by either aggra-
vating or mitigating factors.72 This would ultimately result in a level 
with a corresponding range of percentages which would be used to 
define what portion of the statutory maximum fine would be awarded 
against the violator. 
For example, an organization convicted of mishandling hazardous 
waste would have a base offense level of 8, with a corresponding 
percentage range of 15-25% ($75,000-$125,000 out of $500,000). If the 
mishandling involves a continuous, ongoing, or repetitive discharge, 
the base level is increased by six levels to 14, with a percentage range 
of 35-55% ($175,000-$275,000 out of $500,000).73 Because judicial dis-
cretion is limited to what percentage to assign within any given range, 
70 ADVISORY WORKING GROUP, PROPOSED GUIDELINES, reprinted in RAKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 5, at Appendix M-l, M-24, § 9.1 [hereinafter PROPOSED GUIDELINES]. 
71 [d. § 9B2.1(b)(1H6). The following are the four most important offense characteristics and 
their corresponding base offense levels: 
Section 9B2.1(b)(I) - Knowing Endangerment Resulting From Mishandling Hazardous 
or Toxic Substances, Pesticides or Other Pollutants - Base offense level: 24 
Section 9B2.l(b)(2) - Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic Substances, or Pesticides: 
Recordkeeping, Tampering and Falsification - Base offense level: 8 
Section 9B2.1(b)(3) - Mishandling of Other Environmental Pollutants: Recordkeeping, 
Tampering and Falsification - Base offense level: 6 
Section 9B2.1(b)(6) - Simple Recordkeeping and Reporting - Base offense level: 5 
[d. § 9B2.l(b), reprinted in RAKOFF ET AL., supra note 5, at Appendix M-5 to M-9. 
72 [d. §§ 9C1.l-1.2. Section 9C1.llists the following aggravating factors and the corresponding 
addition to the base offense level: (1) involvement by substantial authority personnel (increase 
by one to four levels); (2) prior criminal compliance history (increase by two to five levels); (3) 
prior civil compliance history (increase by one to two levels); (4) violation of a court order 
(increase by one to three levels); (5) concealment (increase by three to five levels); and (6) 
absence of a compliance program (increase by four levels). [d. § 9C1.1(a)-(f). 
Section 9C1.2 addresses the following mitigating circumstances and the corresponding reduc-
tion to the base offense level: (1) commitment to environmental compliance (reduce by three to 
eight levels); (2) cooperation and self-reporting (reduce by two to six levels); and (3) remedial 
assistance (reduce by two levels). [d. § 9C1.2(a)-(c). 
73 [d. § 9B2.2(b)(2)(B)(i)(a). 
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corporate counsel on the advisory panel argued for broad ranges while 
prosecutors on the advisory panel argued for narrow ranges.74 A 
compromise was reached resulting in narrower ranges in levels 0 to 
11 (a ten percent difference between the high and low ranges) and 
wider ranges after level 11 (a twenty percent difference between the 
high and low ranges). 
Table 475 
Offense Level 
0--6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 or more 
Percentage of Maximum 
Statutory Fine 
10 
10-20 
15-25 
20-30 
25-35 
30-40 
30-50 
30-50 
35-55 
40--60 
45--65 
55-75 
60-80 
65-85 
70-90 
75-95 
80-100 
85-100 
100 
The two dissenters76 strongly disagreed with this new method of 
calculation. The dissenters stated that the new calculation method 
was an unjustified departure from the Chapter 8 philosophy of basing 
sentencing on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the 
offender: 
Simply put, it is far too narrowly drawn on the issue of seriousness 
and totally misses the mark on the issue of culpability .... [One 
example would be to] assume that there is a discharge or emission 
of a substance. The release could amount to a large volume of a 
highly concentrated, highly toxic pollutant. Alternatively, the re-
lease could involve a small volume of dilute and marginally toxic 
74 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Environmental Grime and Punishment, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1994, at 5. 
75 See PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9E1.1, reprinted in RAKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 5, at Appendix M-24. 
76 See Dissent, supra note 8. 
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material. Moreover, the circumstances of the release in terms of 
its likelihood to cause harm could be very different .... The first 
violation is far more serious than the second. However, section 
9El.1 ... allows for only a minuscule range in the fine for the 
particular categories of violation.77 
This concern was reiterated in the dissent's section entitled, "The 
Adoption of a Separate Sentencing Structure for Environmental Crimes 
Is III Advised Because There are No Compelling Grounds for It."78 
'!\vo possible reasons as to why the AWG would propose such sweep-
ing changes are that the Chapter 8 provisions are inadequate for 
environmental violations, or that the Chapter 8 provisions are simply 
inadequate, even for nonenvironmental violations. 
B. Compliance Credit 
The fact that the AWG chose to change radically the structure of 
fine calculations for environmental purposes strongly suggests its 
general dissatisfaction with the existing Chapter 8 structure. This 
point was specifically made by John Coffee, one of the members of the 
AWG: 
At least implicitly, the proposed environmental guidelines repre-
sent a severe critique of the existing organizational guidelines, 
particularly with regard to the current guidelines' easily manipu-
lated credit for corporate compliance plans. Although there is 
today a virtual cottage industry of law firms cranking out compli-
ance plans for their corporate clients (often with the mechanical 
uniformity of a cookie cutter), most of the Advisory Panel that 
drafted the new guidelines was skeptical of both the organiza-
tional premises upon which the existing guidelines rest and the 
likelihood that adoption of such compliance plans would have sig-
nificant beneficial effect upon corporate behavior.79 
The prosecutors on the AWG believed that they would not be able to 
distinguish "good" programs from "bad" programs and would effec-
77Id. at 7-9. 
78Id. at 4. One commentator representing an ad hoc coalition of manufacturers wrote to the 
advisory panel: 
We have yet to see evidence that the handling in Chapter 8 of various organizational 
sentencing issues has been unsuccessful or that treating environmental offenses like 
other offenses is inappropriate. Nonetheless, Chapter 8's phrasing and treatment are 
replaced in many instances with formulations that punish the environmental offender 
more severely than other federal offenders. 
Letter from Benjamin S. Sharp, of Perkins Coie, a Law Partnership Including Professional 
Corporations (May 5, 1993) to the Advisory Working Group on Environmental Sanctions, 
reprinted in RAKOFF ET AL., supra note 5, at Appendix L-2. 
79 Coffee, supra note 74, at 5. 
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tively be giving organizations free credits for paper compliance pro-
grams.so This belief caused the AWG to devise a new reward and 
punishment system dealing with environmental compliance programs. 
Under the OSG, "effective programs to prevent and detect viola-
tions" (also known as "compliance programs") would result in a three 
point downward departure in the culpability score.8! This, coupled with 
either voluntary disclosure to the responsible governmental author-
ity, cooperation with a governmental investigation, or acceptance of 
responsibility could result in the decrease of an organization's fine by 
up to ninety-five percent.82 Even without an effective compliance 
program, organizations without any additional aggravating circum-
stances that self-reported, cooperated with the investigation, and 
accepted responsibility could still qualify for the ninety-five percent 
reduction.83 Maximum credit to organizations without "an effective 
program to prevent and detect violations" has the potential impact of 
marginalizing the compliance concept.84 
This scenario could not happen under the AWG's proposal. The 
AWG created a "sweeter" carrot and a "larger" stick regarding com-
pliance programs. Organizations that do not possess compliance pro-
grams will have their base offense level increased by four levels,85 
while organizations that possess a commitment to environmental com-
pliance will have their offense level reduced by three to eight levels.86 
The AWG was also skeptical that Chapter 8 compliance programs 
could be satisfied without true organizational commitment. Even cor-
porate counsel on the AWG believed that compliance programs should 
not originate and end in an organization's legal department, only to 
be used at sentencing time.87 The AWG attempted to correct this 
perception by requiring environmental compliance to be integrated 
into the daily lives of an organization's employees.88 
80 [d. at 10. 
81 Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8C2.5(t). 
82 [d. § 8C2.5(g). 
83 [d. Because the presumptive level of every fine begins at a culpability score of five, if there 
were no aggravating factors (for example, if the organization was not a large company or if the 
organization did not have a high ranking member involved in the illegal scheme), the organiza-
tion could qualify for a five point reduction for disclosure, cooperation, and acceptance of 
responsibility. See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See PROPOSE;D GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9Cl.l(t). 
86 [d. § 9C1.2(a). 
87 See Coffee, supra note 74, at 29. 
88 This is demonstrated in Section 9Dl.1(a), Minimum Factors Demonstrating a Commitment 
to Environmental Compliance: 
Line Management Attention to Compliance. In the day-to-day operation of the 
organization, line managers, including the executive and operation officers at all levels, 
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The OSG describes seven minimum requirements for an effective 
program to prevent and detect violations.89 The AWG proposal de-
scribes a seven-step process which uses the OSG as a starting point, 
but ultimately both focuses and heightens the OSG's seven minimum 
requirements. Each of the following requirements must be "substan-
tially satisfied" in order to qualify for any mitigation: 
(1) line management attention to compliance, 
(2) integration of environmental policies, standards and proce-
dures, 
(3) auditing, monitoring, reporting and tracking systems, 
(4) regulatory expertise, training and evaluation, 
(5) incentives for compliance, 
(6) disciplinary procedures, 
(7) continuing evaluation and improvement, and 
(8) additional innovative approaches.90 
The dissent disagreed with this proposal, stating that: 
The proposed compliance program is excessive. Within the work 
group, this program was described as a "Cadillac" program or one 
with a "gold" standard. To receive any credit, the organization 
must substantially satisfy each of many requirements. There are 
seven factors; within the seven factors, there are numerous sub-
factors. Some have high thresholds for any credit-substantial 
satisfaction of each subpart-simply is too high. Some mitigation, 
at a reduced level, should be available for good faith compliance 
efforts that meet most but not all of the factors, including subfac-
tors. Good faith compliance efforts reflect a lack of organizational 
culpability that should be recognized and rewarded. 
The program also contains too many command and control re-
quirements. This runs contrary to recognized management ap-
direct their attention, through the management mechanisms utilized throughout the 
organization to measuring, maintaining and improving the organization's compliance 
with environmental laws and regulation. Line managers routinely review environ-
mental monitoring and auditing reports, direct the resolution of identified compliance 
issues, and ensure application of the resources and mechanism necessary to carry out 
a substantial commitment. 
PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9Dl.1(a). 
89 Section 8A1.2 lists these minimum standards as the following: (I) the use of standard 
operating procedures designed to prevent violations from occurring; (2) high level personnel to 
oversee the program; (3) the use of care in not delegating substantial authority to those with a 
tendency to violate laws; (4) the use of codes of conduct or training programs; (5) the use of 
internal controls and monitoring; (6) the consistent enforcement of discipline; and (7) the 
modification of problems in the compliance program. Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, § 8A1.2 
(Commentary, Application Notes: 3(k». 
90 PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9D1.I(a). Item 8, dealing with additional innova-
tive approaches, is considered separately from the first seven items. For an in-depth analysis 
of how to develop environmental compliance programs, see generally Woodrow, supra note 10, 
at 328-30. 
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proaches that establish objectives and leave it to the entity to 
fashion a program that efficiently achieves those objectives.91 
497 
Due to the lack of case law dealing with Chapter 8 violations, 
organizations are uncertain about the actual sentencing impact of 
compliance programs. This knowledge vacuum is the battleground for 
the debate between the AWG majority and the dissent. Prosecutors 
on the AWG believed that organizations would receive credit for 
"paper" compliance programs, which they would be unable to chal-
lenge. The dissent believed that the Guidelines' Chapter 8 process 
should remain until there existed empirical evidence that would jus-
tify a change. Absent empirical evidence or case law, it becomes more 
difficult to defend the AWG's rationale. 
C. The Collar Provision 
The "collar" provision limits the extent to which mitigating circum-
stances can reduce a fine. Proposed Section 9E1.2(b) provides that 
mitigating factors may not reduce a fine below fifty percent of the 
offense level calculated without regard to such factors.92 However, 
because the percentage ranges found in the offense tables vary in 
width (see Table 4), the fifty percent range reduction may produce a 
fine reduction that exceeds fifty percent.93 A special provision of Sec-
tion 9E1.2(b) provides that in no event shall a fine for a "knowing 
endangerment violation" be reduced below fifty percent of the fine.94 
This is a dramatic change from the OSG, which permits mitigating 
factors to reduce a fine by as much as ninety-five percent. 
The concept of establishing a "floor" on mitigation credits was 
controversial. Some members of the AWG expressed concern about 
the deterrent value of sanctions if violators received substantial credit 
for compliance programs.95 Those who expressed concern argued for 
limits to the amount of reductions allowed.96 However, others argued 
that organizations required large incentives to create and maintain 
91 Dissent, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
92 PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9E1.2(b). 
93 Coffee provides an example to illustrate that, in percentage terms, the actual fine reduction 
permitted under this provision is greater than 50 percent. Coffee, supra note 74, at 10. For 
example, if an offense level were 16 before consideration of mitigating factors, then the offense 
level could not fall below level 8 after application of the mitigating factors. However, since the 
Guidelines range for level 16 is 50 percent to 70 percent of the statutory maximum, while the 
Guidelines range for level 8 is 15 percent to 25 percent, the real decrease permitted because of 
mitigating factors could be from 50 percent to 15 percent (or greater than 213 reduction). [d. 
94 PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9E.1.2(b). 
95 Coffee, supra note 74, at 10. 
96 [d. 
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effective compliance programs.97 The fifty percent collar provision 
represents a compromise that still punishes violators, but that also 
gives violators some incentive to establish compliance programs. 
D. The "Count Stacking" Provision 
Under the OSG, the Sentencing Commission took multiple violations 
into account by using a circuitous sentencing route.98 The OSG's Offense 
Fine Level Table utilized the Fine Table from Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3 of the ISG as a starting point;99 and, like Chapter 3, awarded stiffer 
sanctions against multiple violations.loo "Where there is more than one 
such count, apply Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) to deter-
mine the combined offense level."lol Section 3D1.4 calculated the of-
fense level by using the offense with the highest level and increasing 
this level based upon the severity of the additional violations.l02 (See 
Table 5). 
Table 5103 
Number of Units 
1 
11/2 
2 
2112-3 
3 1/2 - 5 
more than 5 
Increase in 
Offense Level 
none 
add 1 level 
add 2 levels 
add 3 levels 
add 4 levels 
add 5 levels 
Although the AWG's proposal also provides harsher sanctions for 
multiple violations, the proposal uses a totally different method of 
calculation.104 How these sanctions are determined is important be-
97 [d. 
98 See Guidelines Manual, supra note 4, at Chapter B. 
99 "For each count covered by § BC2.1 (Applicability of Fine Guidelines), use the applicable 
Chapter Two guideline to determine the base offense level and apply, in the order listed, any 
appropriate adjustments contained in that guideline." [d. § BC2.3(a). 
100 [d. 
101 [d. § BC2.3(b). Violations which were within one to four levels of the original violation would 
be counted as "one unit." [d. § 3Dl.4(a). Offenses which were within five to eight levels of the 
original violation would be counted as one-half unit. [d. § 3Dl.4(b). Offenses which were more 
than nine levels from the original violation would not be counted. [d. § 3Dl.4(c). The judge would 
then add all of the whole and half units together in order to reach the additional number of 
levels to add to the original offense level. [d. § 3Dl.5. 
102 [d. § 3Dl.4. 
103 See id. 
104 PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9El.2(a). 
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cause multiple violations are common within the environmental arena. 
The multiple counts are either due to several independent violations, 
or are the result of ongoing or continuous offense behavior, such as 
barrels of hazardous waste left open for months. Prior to the sentenc-
ing guidelines, courts would look more to the overall offense behavior 
rather than to the number of counts when determining fines. How-
ever, with the sentencing guidelines, organizations can be sentenced 
up to an additional $500,000 for each additional count.105 Thus, prose-
cutors now have an incentive to maximize the number of counts 
("count stacking") to secure potentially higher penalties.106 
When determining the fine for multiple counts, the ESG allows a 
court to reduce the fine if the court determines that there is an 
excessive repetition of counts related to an ongoing or continuous 
offense behavior.107 Such a reduction, however, is unavailable when the 
repetition of counts is related to independent, volitional acts.108 Sec-
tion 9E1.2(a) does provide a "floor," or minimum fine, which limits a 
court's possible fine reduction. 109 The floor is determined as the sum 
of the maximum fines for each count after each count is multiplied by 
its reciprocal. llo Table 6 illustrates a violation with ten counts, with 
the original violation being worth $500,000. The first count would 
receive a fine equal to the statutory maximum of $500,000, the second 
count would be multiplied by its reciprocal (1/2) and given the value 
of $250,000, and, eventually, the tenth count would be multiplied by 
its reciprocal (1/10) and given the value of $50,000. The $1,464,484 sum 
of these numbers would not equal the fine, but would equal the floor 
beneath which a court could not lower the fine on the grounds that 
the indictment contained unnecessary count proliferation. 
105 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1988); see Coffee, supra note 74, at 10. This statement is subject to the 
following further qualifications: (1) § 3571(e) provides that if the law setting forth the offense 
specifies a fine that is lower than $500,000 and exempts its fine level from the applicability of 
§ 3571(c), then that lesser fine controls; and (2) under many sentencing guidelines systems, 
related counts are "grouped," and only the most serious charge in the group is counted. Thus, 
if 100 mailings are sent to the same victim or victims and if each mailing violates the mail fraud 
statute, the sentencing guidelines will group these counts together and punish them as a single 
count. The AWG decided against grouping related environmental counts in this fashion, because 
the AWG found that each additional release or emission does create additional social injury. 
106 Coffee, supra note 74, at 10. According to Coffee, some prosecutors denied that they ever 
engaged in overcharging counts. [d. Other prosecutors frankly conceded that they did seek to 
charge the maximum number of counts, but did so only to cause defendants to plead guilty to 
what they considered to be an "appropriate" level of counts. [d. 
107 PROPOSED GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § 9E1.2. 
108 See id. 
109 [d. 
110 [d. 
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Table 6111 
Number of 
Counts 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
TOTAL FLOOR 
Calculation 
1/1 of $500,000 
1/2 of $500,000 
1/3 of $500,000 
1/4 of $500,000 
1/5 of $500,000 
1/6 of $500,000 
117 of $500,000 
1/8 of $500,000 
1/9 of $500,000 
1/10 of $500,000 
Count Stacking 
Amount 
$500,000 
250,000 
166,666 
125,000 
100,000 
83,333 
71,429 
62,500 
55,556 
50,000 
$1,464,484 
The issue of possible excessive counting and the resulting compro-
mise provision in the Guidelines has been described as an issue that 
"consumed much of the panel's time and produced the most divisive 
debates."112 To illustrate, one of the first proposals simply allowed a 
court to disregard counts which the court considered to be exces-
sively repetitive.113 This amount of discretion, however, was inconsis-
tent with the Guidelines' basic philosophy of structuring judicial de-
cisions.114 Although a ceiling on the maximum number of counts was 
considered, the AWG feared that if an organization discovered that, 
because of a continuing release, it had already exceeded the maximum 
number of counts, there would be no incentive to cease its violation.115 
To avoid this "moral hazard," the AWG determined that "there should 
never be a point at which additional counts or days of violation were 
costless to the [organization]."116 Several formulas were consideredll7 
before the final decision was made that the minimum fine, after allow-
ance for excessive repetitious counts, must at least equal the sum of 
the maximum fines for each count after each such count has been 
multiplied by its reciprocal.118 The net effect of this compromise was 
that, although there was always some additional cost for failing to 
correct a discovered violation, the cost became increasingly smaller 
the further out from the original violation. 
111 See id. 
112 Coffee, supra note 74, at 10. 
113Id. 
114 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
115 Coffee, supra note 74, at 10. 
116Id. 
117 Id. 
118 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
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The dissent believed this formula for count stacking was wrong 
because the formula always assumed that multiple offenses were 
worse than single violations. 
However it is clear that in at least some circumstances multiple 
violations are not worse than single violations. Consider two ex-
amples, with two variations in each. First, suppose that a com-
pany fills in 5 acres of wetland in one day. Alternatively, assume 
that the company fills in one-half acre of wetland over ten sepa-
rate days. There is no environmental difference, yet the guide-
lines would require the sentencing court to impose a fine in the 
second example for ten "volitional" acts that is ten times that in 
the first example. Secondly, assume that a company illegally dis-
charges 500 gallons of wastewater into a river on one day. Alter-
natively, suppose that the company discharges 50 gallons of the 
same wastewater per day for ten days. If there is any environ-
mental difference, it is that the first ''high dose" situation is worse, 
yet the guidelines would require the sentencing court to impose 
a fine in the second hypothetical that is greater than the first.1l9 
The dissent's logic and examples are difficult to argue with and caused 
the Sentencing Commission to question the AWG's proposal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The strength of the dissent, plus the desire to have a full Sentencing 
Commission address environmental concerns, were sufficient to per-
suade the Sentencing Commission to table the AWG's proposal for 
1994. Even with this temporary set-back, the AWG's work provides 
fertile grounds for the next round of proposals which will undoubtedly 
give some credit to compliance programs.120 The question will become, 
"How much credit for what kind of program?" These new environ-
mental sentencing guidelines will be influenced by a new Sentencing 
Commission and a new Republican Congress. Arguably, this Congress 
may favor organizational concerns over environmental concerns and 
accordingly may adopt less sweeping changes than those proposed by 
the AWG. The AWG's proposal represented a stark comparison to the 
established Guidelines. 1Wo possible outcomes would be either to 
119 Dissent, supra note 8, at 15-16. 
120 Whitley & Speckhals, supra note 7, at C4. 
[d. 
Although the sentencing commission in April of this year [1994], decided not to adopt 
the proposed guidelines in the form that the advisory group had recommended, it still 
is likely that mandatory sentencing guidelines for organizations convicted of environ-
mental crimes will be in place by the end of 1996, and will retain at least some of the 
advisory group's focus on compliance programs. 
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have future environmental proposals more closely follow established 
Chapter 8 guidelines or to re-evaluate Chapter 8 to more closely 
follow the AWG's proposal-for example, to increase what consti-
tutes an effective compliance program and to decrease the available 
credit.121 
Both the process and the product of the AWG and its dissenters 
have posed as many questions as they have answered. It is remark-
able that the AWG was able to hammer out a compromise acceptable 
to fourteen of its sixteen members. Irrespective of whether the AWG's 
proposal was adopted in 1994, this process represents a model that 
future regulatory negotiations should emulate. 
121 See Coffee, supra note 74, at 29. 
